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Abstract
Decision making relies on the interplay between two distinct learning mechanisms, namely habitual model-free learning and
goal-directed model-based learning. Recent literature suggests that this interplay is significantly shaped by the environmental
structure as represented by an internal model. We employed a modified two-stage but one-decision Markov decision task to
investigate how two internal models differing in the predictability of stage transitions influence the neural correlates of feedback
processing. Our results demonstrate that fronto-central theta and the feedback-related negativity (FRN), two correlates of reward
prediction errors in the medial frontal cortex, are independent of the internal representations of the environmental structure. In
contrast, centro-parietal delta and the P3, two correlates possibly reflecting feedback evaluation in working memory, were highly
susceptible to the underlying internal model. Model-based analyses of single-trial activity showed a comparable pattern, indi-
cating that while the computation of unsigned reward prediction errors is represented by theta and the FRN irrespective of the
internal models, the P3 adapts to the internal representation of an environment. Our findings further substantiate the assumption
that the feedback-locked components under investigation reflect distinct mechanisms of feedback processing and that different
internal models selectively influence these mechanisms.
Keywords Event-related potentials . Feedback processing . Model-free learning . Model-based learning . Reinforcement
learning . Time-frequency analysis
Introduction
In our everyday life, decision making is usually accompanied
by uncertainties. To resolve these uncertainties, a variety of
informational cues can guide behavior. Past experience with
decision outcomes can act as a valuable and straightforward
criterion that indicates whether the decision maker should re-
peat or switch actions. For instance, if the last meal at a spe-
cific restaurant was of poor quality, maybe one should con-
sider changing the restaurant next time. However, the history
of past decision outcomes is not the only cue that can guide
decision making. For example, internal models based on ex-
plicit knowledge, such as reviews on a restaurant`s quality,
may serve as a good proxy for costly experience and thus
can facilitate the optimization of decision making. It is as-
sumed that these two sources of information—past experience
and internal models—improve decision making via two
different learning mechanisms called model-free learning
and model-based learning (Daw & O’Doherty, 2014; Dayan
& Berridge, 2014; O’Doherty, Cockburn, & Pauli, 2017).
Despite the long held assumption of computationally disso-
ciable learning mechanisms, recent literature suggests an inte-
gration of model-free and model-based information at the lev-
el of feedback processing (Daw, Gershman, Seymour, Dayan,
& Dolan, 2011; Sambrook, Hardwick, Wills, & Goslin,
2018), and this integration might be sensitive to the structure
of the environment as represented by an internal model
(Eppinger, Walter, & Li, 2017; Lee, Shimojo, & O’Doherty,
2014). We ask how different environmental structures and
thus internal models exert influence on both behavioral and
neural aspects of feedback evaluation. We contrasted environ-
ments with predictable and random stage transitions in a mul-
tistage task and investigated which neural correlates of feed-
back processing in event-related potentials (ERPs) and oscil-
latory activity are sensitive to differences between the in-
volved internal models.
Learning from feedback has typically been formalized
within the reinforcement learning framework, which assumes
that stimulus-response reward associations are acquired and
updated on a trial-by-trial basis to flexibly guide behavior
(Sutton & Barto, 1998). Current psychological theories
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propose that not only a single but two (or more) qualitatively
distinct families of reinforcement learning mechanisms are at
hand to guide choice behavior (Dayan &Niv, 2008).Habitual
or model-free reinforcement learning mechanisms learn to
choose between actions by, first, assigning values to actions
based on their past history of reward and punishment, and
then, deciding for the action with the highest value. To validly
estimate the value of an action, a so-called reward prediction
error (RPE) is calculated. RPEs reflect the difference between
an action`s value estimate from past experience and the actual
outcome of the action on the given trial and therefore provide
the decision maker with an instrumental teaching signal to
optimize behavior. By incrementally integrating RPEs in the
estimated value of a chosen action, outcome expectations are
formed in a retrospective manner, thus allowing for an
experience-driven behavioral adaptation. However, because
expectations derived from RPEs fail to establish an explicit
representation of environmental contingencies, the decision
maker often behaves inaccurately in complex environments
(Dayan & Niv, 2008; Doll, Simon, & Daw, 2012). This dis-
advantage of model-free mechanisms is overcome by goal-
directed or model-based reinforcement learning mechanisms,
which are able to prospectively form expectations based on
explicit knowledge about environmental contingencies.
Numerous sources of explicit knowledge can be identified
including learning from instructions to mere observation with-
out feedback, or deliberate reasoning. Crucially, these model-
based mechanisms generate an internal (world) model that
allows for deriving predictions about future states of the ex-
ternal world (Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005; Dickinson &
Balleine, 2002; Doya, 1999; Gläscher, Daw, Dayan, &
O’Doherty, 2010; Tolman, 1948), further improving adaptiv-
ity beyond model-free learning.
On a behavioral level, evidence for model-based learning
primarily comes from studies using multistage decision prob-
lems, such as the Markov decision task (Daw, Gershman,
Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2011). In a classic version of the
task, participants are faced with a decision between two stim-
uli at a first decision stage. With a given set of transition
probabilities (the transition structure), each decision at the
first stage leads to two distinct stimulus pairs presented at a
second decision stage. More specifically, each first-stage de-
cision is linked with one of the stimulus pairs with a high
probability (common transition) and with the alternative stim-
ulus pair with a low probability (rare transition). Depending
on the participants’ second-stage decision, feedback about a
monetary reward or loss is delivered. Each of the stimuli at the
second stage is associated with a distinct reward probability
that changes over time (the reward structure). Crucially,
model-based mechanisms and model-free mechanisms differ
with respect to how information about the probability of a
transition between first-stage decisions and second-stage stim-
uli is incorporated for optimizing first-stage decisions. On the
one hand, the model-free mechanisms adapt their behavior
only with respect to past outcomes but regardless of whether
that past outcome followed a common or rare transition be-
tween first-stage decision and second-stage stimuli.
Irrespective of the probability of the experienced transition,
a reward after the second stage would reinforce the first-stage
decision and thus increase the probability that the same first-
stage decision is made again, thus leading to stay behavior. On
the other hand, the model-based mechanisms show the emer-
gence of an interactive pattern between past outcome and
transition. After a common transition, reward would reinforce
the first-stage decision in the same way as in model-free learn-
ing and thus would lead to stay behavior. In contrast, a reward
after a rare transition would reinforce the first-stage decision
that would lead to the same outcome via the common transi-
tion, thus increasing the probability of the alternative first-
stage decision leading to switch behavior. The predicted be-
havioral patterns of these two families of learning mecha-
nisms, which culminate in a main effect of outcome (model-
free) and an interaction between outcome and transition
(model-based) have been repeatedly confirmed in humans
(Daw et al., 2011; Doll, Bath, Daw, & Frank, 2016; Doll,
Duncan, Simon, Shohamy, & Daw, 2015; Gläscher et al.,
2010; Lee et al., 2014; Wunderlich, Smittenaar, & Dolan,
2012).
To investigate the neural correlates of model-free and
model-based reinforcement learning, EEG can be used to pre-
cisely track processes at the different stages of the Markov
decision task. When it comes to feedback processing, separa-
ble time-domain and frequency-domain components have al-
ready been identified to play a major role in reinforcement
learning and the formation of expectations: In the time-do-
main, the feedback-related negativity (FRN) which is a
fronto-central component that occurs between 200 and
350 ms after feedback presentation is hypothesized to reflect
an RPE (Chase, Swainson, Durham, Benham, & Cools, 2011;
Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Sambrook & Goslin, 2015). It is
typically measured as a negative deflection following negative
outcomes relative to positive outcomes: the so-called FRN
effect. Although still a matter of debate (Sambrook &
Goslin, 2016; Sambrook et al., 2018), the FRN is suggested
to be modulated by model-free expectations (see San Martín,
2012;Walsh &Anderson, 2012). A further component related
to expectancy is the P3, which is hypothesized to be involved
in the updating of working-memory representations (Polich,
2007). The P3 is a parietal and positive going component that
occurs around 300-600 ms after stimulus presentation. When
elicited by feedback, the P3 has been shown to be associated
with expectancy modulations, i.e., larger amplitudes follow-
ing unexpected outcomes (Bellebaum&Daum, 2008; Hajcak,
Holroyd,Moser, & Simons, 2005; Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, &
Simons, 2007; but also see Wu& Zhou, 2009). Because it has
been proposed to be associated with the updating of an
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internal world model in working memory (Donchin & Coles,
1988; Nieuwenhuis, Aston-Jones, & Cohen, 2005; but see
Rac-Lubashevsky & Kessler, 2019), the P3 could be viewed
as being closely linked to model-based reinforcement
learning.
In addition to these ERPs, neural oscillations have been
shown to reflect specific aspects of feedback processing.
Theta band activity (4-8 Hz) at frontocentral electrodes has
been suggested to communicate the need for cognitive control
and behavioral adaptation (Cavanagh & Frank, 2014;
Cavanagh & Shackman, 2015). With its spatial distribution
similar to the FRN (e.g., Cavanagh, Figueroa, Cohen, &
Frank, 2012), fronto-central theta has also been found to re-
flect the evaluation of primary stimulus features such as out-
come valence and salience (Bernat, Nelson, & Baskin-
Sommers, 2015) as well as RPEs (Cavanagh, Frank, Klein,
& Allen, 2010). A further frequency band that has been found
to reflect RPEs (Cavanagh, 2015) is the delta band (1-4Hz). In
contrast to fronto-central theta, centro-parietal delta activity
might reflect the assessment of higher-order secondary stim-
ulus features, such as relative outcome (Bernat et al., 2015).
Taken together, while theta and delta activity appear to reflect
separable cognitive processes and contribute differentially to
the ERPwaveforms (Bernat et al., 2015; Cavanagh, 2015), the
relationship between frequency components, ERP compo-
nents, and the underlying mechanisms is still unclear and a
matter of ongoing research.
The goal of the present study was to investigate the influ-
ence of distinguishable internal models of the environmental
structure on the neural correlates of feedback processing. To
allow for the emergence of two distinguishable internal
models, we contrasted two different transition structures in a
two-stage Markov decision task (Eppinger et al., 2017; Lee
et al., 2014). In the predictable condition, transition probabil-
ities were highly differentiated between common and rare
transitions (75% vs. 25%; see Fig. 1A, black and white ar-
rows), leading to an easily predictable transition structure. We
hypothesized that such a predictable transition structure
should favor the formation of an equally predictable internal
world model, which can be used to adapt first-stage decisions
on a trial-to-trial basis. In the random condition, transition
probabilities were fixed at chance level (50%; see Fig. 1A,
gray arrows), resulting in a random (i.e., unpredictable) tran-
sition structure. We hypothesized that this should favor the
formation of an internal world model that promotes stochastic
(i.e., random) behavior, thus counteracting trial-to-trial adap-
tation of first-stage decisions.1 Crucially, despite their
differing transition structure, both task conditions had an iden-
tical reward structure. That is, the conditional reward proba-
bility given a specific second-stage stimulus was the same
across both conditions. This allowed us to investigate effects
of reward expectancy on feedback processing in both condi-
tions without confounding differences in these objective con-
ditional reward probabilities.
Our central question was which neural correlates of feed-
back processing are sensitive to the type of internal model.We
first investigated stay/switch behavior in the two conditions.
While the predictable condition should reveal the usually ob-
tained signatures of model-based and model-free control, an
important question was whether we find evidence for behav-
ioral adaptation in the random condition. Although the ran-
dom condition does not allow for separating the contribution
of model-free and model-based control, demonstrating an ef-
fect of reward on subsequent stay probabilities in this condi-
tion would show that feedback is utilized for behavioral adap-
tation even when this feedback cannot be used to improve
first-stage decisions. We then analyzed feedback-related ac-
tivity in the time and frequency domain to investigate which
components are sensitive to the type of internal model. In
addition to valence effects, we focused on expectancy effects
(based on conditional reward probabilities) as these indicate
whether activity is related to an RPE. We expected to find
reduced valence and expectancy effects in the random com-
pared with the predictable condition for components sensitive
to a model-based feedback evaluation. Because the random
internal model promotes stochastic behavior rather than a
feedback-based adaptation of first-stage decisions, compo-
nents involved in model-based feedback evaluation should
be attenuated in the random condition. In a second part, we
fit computational models to the data, which explicitly imple-
mented the ideas of a random and predictable internal model.
Crucially, these models allowed for deriving trial-wise RPE
estimates, which could then be used to inform EEG data anal-
ysis. By correlating these RPEs with single-trial measure of
feedback-related activity separately for the random and pre-
dictable conditions, we obtained a complementary measure of
the strength by which each component is involved in process-
ing feedback in these conditions.
Material and methods
Participants
Thirty-seven participants (30 females) between 19 and 33
years of age (M = 23.00, SD = 3.49) with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision participated in the study.
Participants were recruited at the Catholic University of
Eichstätt-Ingolstadt and received course credit for participa-
tion and a performance-dependent bonus (M = 0.55 €). For the
1 We define an internal model as any explicit mental representation of contin-
gencies, here, between first-stage decisions and second-stage stimuli of the
Markov decision task. While we assume that the predictable and random
conditions lead to the formation of different internal models, this does not
necessarily imply that the random condition involves model-based control.
We will further discuss this question in the discussion section.
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analyses, seven participants were excluded due to excessive
EEG artifacts, and one participant was excluded due to low
performance in set identification (for further details, see be-
low). Taken together, 29 participants (24 females) between 19
and 33 years of age (M = 22.69, SD = 3.70) entered the anal-
yses. All participants provided informed consent and the study
protocol was approved by the ethical committee of the
Catholic University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt.
Stimuli
The stimuli consisted of 32 greyscale-normalized quadratic
fractals derived from a Mandelbrot set (for examples, see
Fig. 1A). Pictures were converted into 200 x 200 pixel images
with a side length of 4.45° visual angle at a viewing distance
of 70 cm. Before the experiment, all pictures were grouped
into eight sets with four stimulus pictures each. From each set,
two randomly drawn pictures were assigned to be first-stage
stimuli, and the remaining two were assigned to be second-
stage stimuli. Half of the sets were assigned to the predictable
condition and the other half to the random condition. Each
picture was presented in a frame with the frame color (light
gray or dark gray), indicating the condition (predictable or
random). Frame colors and sets were assigned randomly for
each block. The resulting stimuli had a side length of 5.16°
visual angle. All stimuli were presented on a black
background.
Task and procedure
A crucial goal of this study was to investigate the effects of
feedback expectedness on feedback-related brain activity in
two conditions (random vs. predictable) that a) differ in the
involved internal model, but b) are associated with compara-
ble feedback probabilities. To achieve this, we modified the
classical two-stage Markov decision task in the following way
(Figure 1A). Participants first chose between two first-stage
stimuli. The transition structure determined the probabilities
Fig. 1 a. Schematic representation of the environmental contingencies
for the predictable and random conditions. The conditions differed
regarding their transition structure but had an identical reward structure.
b. Graphical illustration of a trial: After fixation cross presentation,
participants had to decide between two pictures at Stage 1 and were
subsequently forwarded to Stage 2. Depending on the second-stage stim-
ulus, feedback was presented. c. Stay probabilities, averaged across sub-
jects. Error bars depict ±SEM. Gray circles indicate stay probabilities for
the individual subjects. d. Subjects’ performance in predictable condi-
tions, plotted as the mean proportion of correct decisions across sub-
blocks. Correct decisions are defined as first-stage choices for the stimu-
lus which commonly led to the high reward second-stage picture.
Subblocks were assigned post-hoc by separating the 50 trials of the pre-
dictable condition in each block into ten equal parts, consisting of 5 trials.
Dashed lines depict ±SEM
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by which a specific second-stage stimulus could occur. As in a
previous study (Gillan, Otto, Phelps, & Daw, 2015), this
second-stage stimulus consisted of a single picture and no
further decision was required at the second stage. Feedback
was delivered only on the basis of this second-stage stimulus.
The probability of positive and negative feedback was deter-
mined by a reward structure that was identical between ran-
dom and predictable conditions and remained constant over
time. Trials from the random and predictable conditions were
randomly intermixed, and participants had to find out them-
selves which stimuli were associated with each condition.
This was done to prevent systematic strategic differences
(e.g., ignoring feedback in the random condition) and thus to
make the two conditions as similar. The analogous reward
structure in the two conditions ensured that differential expec-
tancy effects on feedback-related brain activity are not related
to changing objective reward probabilities (as in the classical
Markov decision task) but can be traced back to the hypothe-
sized differences in the involvement of internal models be-
tween conditions.
The random and predictable conditions differed only with
respect to the transition structure between the first and the
second stage (Figure 1A). Choosing a stimulus from the two
first-stage stimuli implied that each of the two possible
second-stage stimuli appeared with a specific probability,
and this probability differed between predictable and random
conditions. In the predictable condition, one of the two first-
stage stimuli was linked to one second-stage stimulus with a
probability of 75% (common transition; black arrow in Fig.
1A) and to the other second-stage stimulus with a probability
of 25% (rare transition; white arrow in Fig. 1A), and these
probabilities were reversed for the other first-stage stimulus.
In the random condition, all transition probabilities between
first-stage and second-stage stimuli were fixed at 50% (gray
arrows in Fig. 1A). The reward structure between the second
stage and the feedback was the same for predictable and ran-
dom conditions. In each condition, one of the two second-
stage stimuli led to a win with a probability of 70% (high
reward stimulus) whereas the other second-stage stimulus
led to a loss with a probability of 70% (low reward stimulus).
Crucially, this implies that although predictable and random
conditions differed with respect to the transition structure
(probability of second-stage stimulus given first-stage deci-
sion), the reward structure (probability of feedback given
second-stage stimulus), and thus the expectedness of feedback
was the same across conditions.
The procedure of a trial is illustrated in Fig. 1B. At the
beginning of each trial, one of the two conditions (predictable
vs. random) was randomly chosen. First, a fixation cross was
shown for a random and exponentially distributed interval
ranging between 500 and 1,000 ms. Then, the first-stage stim-
uli of the chosen condition were presented for 2,000 ms in
counterbalanced order (left, right). During this time,
participants had to make a choice by either pressing the “E”
(left) or “I” (right) key of a standard keyboard using the index
finger of the left or right hands. If no response had occurred
before stimulus offset, the trial was aborted and a miss feed-
back was presented until participants continued by pressing
the space key. If a response had occurred, another fixation
cross was presented for a random interval between 500 and
1,000 ms. Then, the second-stage stimulus was presented for
1,000 ms. The second-stage stimulus was chosen based on the
participants’ first-stage decision and the condition-specific
transition structure. After the presentation of the second-
stage stimulus, again a fixation cross was displayed for 500
to 1,000 ms, followed by one of two feedback stimuli for
1,000 ms. Feedback was chosen based on the reward structure
explained above. Diamonds indicated wins (+3 ct), whereas
stones indicated losses (−3 ct). At the end of each trial a fix-
ation cross, again displayed for 500 to 1,000 ms, led to a
screen that informed participants whether a decision wasmade
in the previous trial and participants were instructed to press
the space key to continue to the next trial.
For each of the four blocks employed in the experiment,
participants worked through 100 trials. Each of the sets asso-
ciated with a condition (random vs. predictable) was presented
equally often, resulting in 50 trials of the predictable condition
and 50 trials of the random condition. The two conditions
were randomly mixed with the constraint that one condition
could only be presented by a maximum of three trials in a row.
At the beginning of each block participants saw a screen pro-
viding a brief reminder of the most important task features
(e.g., reward magnitudes, transition structure, and relevant
keys). However, they were not instructed about which set
was assigned to which condition (predictable vs. random).
To familiarize participants with the abstract visual stimuli,
all stimuli used in the upcoming block were presented ran-
domly but arranged by set and stage. At the end of each block,
participants were asked to judge (1) which set yielded more
bonus and (2) which set had the predictable transition struc-
ture. The second question was used to exclude blocks from the
EEG analysis in which participants did not correctly identify
the predictable and random set.
Before starting the main experiment, participants were
instructed and practiced the task by working through two
practice blocks. In the first practice block, participants learned
about the probabilistic reward structure via written instruc-
tions and by viewing 20 trials to demonstrate the probabilistic
link between the second stage and the feedback stage. In the
second practice block, participants learned about the probabi-
listic transition structure. Again, they received written instruc-
tion but completed 20 active practice trials, demonstrating the
probabilistic link between the first and the second stage.
Stimuli used in the practice blocks were not used in the main
part of the experiment. In the instruction, the task was framed
as a treasure hunting. Participants should imagine to be
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treasure hunters. Stimulus pairs at the first stage were
instructed to be a treasure map with two possible routes that
can be taken to search for treasures. On their way, natural
disasters and monsters may lead the treasure hunter astray,
which sometimes results in following the nonchosen route.
Second stage stimuli were introduced as treasure chests which
would contain or not contain treasure.
Data acquisition and analysis
Behavioral data were analyzed using MatLab v8.6 (The
Mathworks Inc., Natick, MA) and R (R Core Team, 2016).
A RL model was implemented and fitted using R and STAN
(Carpenter et al. 2017). ERP data were analyzed using
custom-made routines in MatLab as well as EEGLAB
13.5.4b (Delorme & Makeig, 2004), an open source toolbox
for EEG data analysis (EEGLAB toolbox for single-trial EEG
data analysis , Swartz Center for Computat ional
Neurosciences, La Jolla, CA; http://www.sccn.ucsd.edu/
eeglab).
Behavioral data In line with previous work (Daw et al., 2011;
Gillan et al., 2015), behavioral data were analyzed using lo-
gistic regression with mixed-effect models. The predictable
and random conditions were analyzed separately as transition
type (common vs. rare) could be distinguished only for the
predictable condition. For analyzing the predictable condition,
we submitted reward type and transition type of the preceding
trial of the same condition (here: predictable) as predictors to
test for stay/switch behavior in the present trial. The reward
type of the preceding trial could either be a win or a loss
(coded as 1 and −1). The transition type could either be
common or rare (coded as 1 and −1). The choice type could
either be a switch or stay in behavior (coded as 0 and 1)
depending on both the choice on the preceding trial of the
same condition and the ongoing trial. For the random condi-
tion, the same analysis was used with the exception that tran-
sition type was omitted. Please note that, in both analyses, the
preceding trial for the analysis was not necessarily the preced-
ing trial in the experiment, because the random and predict-
able condition were presented in random sequence in a block.
Finally, in both analyses, the within-subjects variables (inter-
cept, main effects of reward and transition type, their interac-
tion) were implemented as random effects and therefore were
allowed to vary across participants (Daw et al., 2011; Gillan
et al., 2015).
Computational modeling Behavioral data were further ana-
lyzed using computational modeling. Whereas the regression
analysis above takes only information from the last trial of the
same condition into account, this model-based approach ac-
counts for incremental effects of learning across several trials.
Furthermore, the explicit implementation of the internal
representations in our computational models allows for an
in-depth assessment of how neural activity is related to spe-
cific aspects of learning such as RPEs. As described in previ-
ous studies (Daw et al., 2011; Eppinger et al., 2016; Gillan
et al., 2015), we fitted participants’ choice behavior using a
hybrid RL model, which can isolate the contributions of
model-based and model-freemechanisms to individual behav-
ior. Although we do not knowwhether model-based control is
involved in the random condition, we also applied a hybrid
architecture for this condition. Here, the “model-based”mech-
anism represents the chance level transition probabilities from
the random condition. As a consequence, this mechanism in-
troduces stochastic (i.e., random) choice behavior in the mod-
el which counteracts model-free control. Whether such a
mechanism can be viewed as corresponding to model-based
control is discussed in the discussion section. Because its com-
putational implementation is equivalent to model-based con-
trol in the predictable condition, it is introduced as a model-
based mechanism belowwhich however should not imply any
interpretation on the nature of this mechanism.
The model-free mechanism uses temporal difference learn-
ing to incrementally update stimulus values, QMF ∣ S2 for ob-
served picture px of trial t at the second stage according to the
equation
QMFjS2 px; t þ 1ð Þ ¼ QMFjS2 px; tð Þ þ α r tð Þ−QMFjS2 px; tð Þ
h i
;
where α is the learning rate and r(t) the reward received in that
trial. The term in square brackets contains the RPE elicited by
the feedback. Then, action values for the visited state-action
pair a at the first stage, QMF ∣ S1, are updated according to the
equation
QMFjS1 a; t þ 1ð Þ ¼ QMFjS1 a; tð Þ
þα QMFjS1 a; tð Þ−QMFjS2 px; tð Þ
h i
þαλ r tð Þ−QMFjS2 px; tð Þ
h i
;
where λ is the eligibility trace parameter, α is the learning rate
and r(t) the reward received in that trial. To simulate forget-
ting,Q values for the non-chosen actions or unpresented stim-
uli were decayed by multiplying them by (1 - α) (Lau &
Glimcher, 2005).
The model-based mechanism takes both the instructed and
experienced transition structure to construct an internal model
of the different task conditions. The cumulative integration
and updating of the experienced state-action transitions allows
for estimating the underlying model of the environment based
on the instructed transition probabilities. Because participants
in our study were confronted with both a predictable (75% and
25%) and a random condition (50%) in each block resulting in
two distinct internal models, we had to model explicitly the
decision process by which participants determined which of
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the sets was associated with the predictable or random internal
model, respectively. This was done by using a higher-level
evaluation mechanisms described in previous studies (Daw
et al., 2011; Gillan et al., 2015). This process counts the num-
bers of set-specific transitions from action ax to second-stage
picture py for each set. On each trial, it then calculates the
differences between counters representing the common and
rare assignments within each set. The absolute value of this
difference reflects the predictability of a set (because higher
values indicate that some transitions are more frequent than
others), and the set with the higher absolute difference is iden-
tified as the predictable condition. The same counters are then
used for determining the direction of the transition structure.
For the predictable internal model, the mechanism chooses
between two possibilities when presented with first-stage
stimulus pair: (1) P(pA| aA) = 0.75, P(pB| aB) = 0.75, or
(2) P(pA| aA) = 0.25, P(pB| aB) = 0.25), with P(pA| aB) = 1 −
P(pA| aA) and P(pB| aA) = 1 − P(pB| aB), according to whether
the internal transition counter had detected more transitions
to pA following aA plus pB following aB or more transitions
to pB following aA plus pA following aB. For the random in-
ternal model, the probabilities P(pA| aA) = 0.5, P(pB| aB) = 0.5
were applied.
At the second stage, model-based RL coincides with the
TD learning algorithm described above, because QMF ∣ S2(px,
t) is an estimate of the received reward r(t). Estimates for the
first-stage model-based values are defined as a mixture of both
transition and reward estimates using the Bellman Equation
(Bellman, 1957):
QMBjS1 aj; t
  ¼ P pAjaj
 
QMFjS2 pA; tð Þ
þ P pBjaj
 
QMFjS2 pB; tð Þ
To connect Q values to participants’ choices, a net value
which is the weighted combination of the model-free and
model-based first-stage action values, Qnet(a, t) = ωQMB(a,
t) + (1 − ω)QMF(a, t) was calculated. The model-basedness
parameter ω approaches 1 if the model-based mechanism is
predominant and approaches 0 when the model-free mech-
anism is predominant. After joining together model-free
and model-based action values, the resulting net action
values were converted into action probabilities using a
softmax function,
P at ¼ að Þ ¼ exp β*Qnet a; tð Þ þ ρ*rep að Þð Þ∑a0exp β*Qnet a0; tð Þ þ ρ*rep a0ð Þð Þ
;
where the inverse temperature parameter β guides the
stochasticity of the choices and the perseveration parame-
ter ρ captures choice perseveration (ρ > 0) or switching (ρ
< 0) (Lau & Glimcher, 2005). The indicator function rep(a)
takes the value 1 if action a is the same as that in the last
trial of the same set, and zero otherwise.
Using Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling, we
estimated the free parameters of multiple Bayesian hybrid RL
models for each set, block and participant individually.
Additionally, we fit group-level distributions for some
models. All parameters were held constant during the blocks.
Comparison between the different models via the Watanabe-
Akaike Information Criterion (WAIC, Vehtari & Gelman,
2014; Watanabe, 2010) indicated that the best fitting model
contained five general parameters (α, λ, β, ω, ρ) in a hierar-
chical framework. Values for each set and participant were
derived from a single parameter-specific hyperparameter dis-
tribution. Reported parameter values represent the mean of
their estimated distributions. Models with reduced parameter
space and freedom led to higher WAIC scores indicating
worse fits. For the subsequent electrophysiological analyses,
RPEs were derived by feeding the estimated parameters back
into the same model that was used to calculate the model
parameters.
Electrophysiological recordings and ERP analysis
Throughout the experiment, participants were seated comfort-
able in a dimly lit room. The electroencephalogram (EEG)
was recorded using a BIOSEMI Active-Two system
(BioSemi, Amsterdam, The Netherlands) with 64 Ag-AgCl
electrodes placed according to the extended International 10-
20 EEG system, as well as the left and right mastoid. The
CMS (common mode sense) and DRL (driven right leg) elec-
trodes were used as reference and ground electrodes. Vertical
and horizontal electrooculogram (EOG) were recorded from
electrodes above and below the right eye and on the outer
canthi of both eyes. All electrodes were offline re-referenced
to averaged mastoids. EEG and EOG were continuously re-
corded at a sampling rate of 512 Hz.
EEG data were band-pass filtered to exclude frequencies
below 0.1 Hz and above 40 Hz and divided into epochs from
1,000 ms before to 1,500 ms after feedback onset. Baseline
activity from 200ms before feedback onset was removed. Bad
channels were interpolated using spherical spline interpolation
if they met the joint probability criterion (threshold 5) as well
as the kurtosis criterion (threshold 5) in EEGLAB’s channel
rejection routine. Epochs were excluded whenever neural ac-
tivity in a channel deviated more than ±300 μV from the
epoch mean. This criterion was not applied to those channels
that are typically contaminated by blinks (Fp1, Fpz, Fp2, AF7,
and AF8) as this activity was corrected later. In a next step, an
infomax-based independent component analysis (ICA, Bell &
Sejnowski, 1995) implemented in EEGLAB was conducted.
After visual inspection of the derived independent compo-
nents, those that represented eye blinks and muscular artifacts
were identified and removed from the data. Furthermore,
blocks in which participants did misjudge the predictable
and random sets were excluded from the analyses (24.5% of
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all trials2). This was done to prevent a biasing effect of incor-
rectly identified condition mappings. The remaining epochs
were averaged separately for each participant and condition.
On average, this resulted in the following numbers of artifact-
free trials in the respective feedback conditions: 57.9 (SD =
21.22) for win/expected/predictable, 30.2 (SD = 10.64) for
loss/expected/predictable, 14.3 (SD = 5.04) for win/unexpect-
ed/predictable, 23.2 (SD = 9.87) for loss/unexpected/predict-
able, 40.9 (SD = 16.81) for win/expected/random, 43.5 (SD =
13.63) for loss/expected/random, 19.6 (SD = 8.06) for win/
unexpected/random and 19.2 (SD = 7.49) for loss/unexpected/
random.
Time-frequency measures were computed by multiplying
the fast Fourier transformed (FFT) power spectrum of the
single-trial EEG data with the FFT power spectrum of a set
of complex Morlet wavelets. These wavelets are defined as a
family of Gaussian-windowed complex sine waves according
to e−i2πtf e−t
2=2σ2, with the time t, the frequency f (increasing
from 1 to 50 Hz in 50 logarithmically spaced steps) and the
width of each frequency band σ which was set according to
4/2πf. Power was normalized by conversion to a decibel (dB)
scale and using a baseline from -300 to -200 prior to the onset
of feedback (see Cavanagh, 2015).
In line with previous studies (Chase et al., 2011; Frank,
Woroch, & Curran, 2005; Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, &
Cohen, 2003; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004), FRN amplitudes were
quantified using peak-to-peak measures at electrode FCz. To
allow reliable peak amplitude estimation, a 15 Hz low-pass
second-order Butterworth filter was applied (Frank et al.,
2005). For each participant, the filtered data were split into
the conditions of interest and averaged. FRN amplitudes were
determined by 1) identifying the most negative peak within a
time window of 200-350 ms after feedback onset, and 2)
subtracting the average of the preceding and succeeding pos-
itive peaks. The preceding and succeeding peaks were quan-
tified as the most positive deflections in time windows 100 ms
before and after the FRN peak, respectively. Following Chase
et al. (2011), if the maxima were on the edge of the window,
the size of the window was stepwise widened by 10 ms up to
300 ms. The averaged empirical latencies ranged between 74
and 287 ms for the preceding peaks, between 184 and 340 ms
for the FRN peaks, and between 244 and 490 ms for the
succeeding peaks. Theta band power (4-8 Hz; Cavanagh,
2010) was measured as the mean amplitude in a time window
of 200-400 ms after feedback presentation (Cavanagh et al.,
2010; Sambrook & Goslin, 2014) at electrode FCz. The P3
amplitude and the delta band power (1-4 Hz; Cavanagh, 2015)
were measured as the mean amplitude/power in a time win-
dow of 300-500 ms after feedback presentation at electrode Pz
(Cavanagh, 2015; Chase et al., 2011; SanMartín, 2012). Time
domain and frequency domain components were averaged
separately for each participant and condition. For both ERP
and time-frequency analyses, we chose an analysis design that
compares losses and wins of equal probability and thus expec-
tancy (Holroyd et al. 2009). Wins after transitions from high-
probability reward stimuli (70%) and losses after transitions
from low-probability reward stimuli (70%) at the second stage
were assigned to the expected outcome condition. Wins after
low-probability reward stimuli (30%) and losses after high-
probability reward stimuli (30%) at the second stage were
assigned to the unexpected outcome condition. Expectancy
was thus solely based on the fixed reward structure, which
was analogous for the predictable and random conditions.
We applied repeated measures ANOVAs involving the vari-
ables condition (predictable, random), expectancy (expected,
unexpected) and valence (win, loss) for each dependent mea-
sure (FRN amplitudes, theta power, P3 amplitudes, delta
power).
To analyze the relationship between EEG activity and
RPEs in our computational model, we quantified single-trial
amplitudes of our neural measures using the identical mea-
sures as in the analyses for the averaged EEG activity.
Single-trial FRN amplitudes were quantified using the peak-
to-peak method. Single-trial P3 amplitudes were quantified
using the mean amplitude in the time window of 300-500
ms after feedback presentation. Single-trial theta power and
single-trial delta power was quantified by averaging across the
respective time windows (theta: 200-400 ms; delta: 300-500
ms) and frequency spectra (theta: 4-8 Hz; delta: 1-4 Hz) at the
respective electrodes. Given the ongoing debate about wheth-
er the FRN and theta power reflects signed or unsigned RPEs
(Chase et al., 2011), separate regression analyses for positive
and negative RPEs were calculated, and absolute values of
model RPEs were used. Accordingly, we expected similar
signs for regression slopes of positive and negative feedback
if this activity reflects an unsigned RPE. Slopes were tested
against zero using one-sample t-tests and were entered into an
ANOVA involving the variables valence (positive RPEs, neg-
ative RPEs) and condition (predictable, random).
Results
Behavioral data
In a first analysis, we investigated to which extent participants
were able to improve their choice behavior via learning in the
predictable and random conditions. For the predictable condi-
tion, an obvious measure of correct task performance is the
proportion of first-stage responses leading to the high reward
second-stage stimulus via a common transition. Figure 1D
2 These trials were removed to prevent additional noise in the analysis.
However, including these trials did not qualitatively change the pattern of
results.
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shows that this proportion reaches about 80% at the end of the
block. However, such a measure is not applicable to the ran-
dom condition in which no “correct” first-stage response can
be defined. To allow for a comparison of the two conditions,
we therefore considered the bonus obtained in each condition.
We found the mean bonus per block in the predictable condi-
tion (M = 0.16 €, SD = 0.16) to be significantly higher than in
the random condition (M = 0.02 €, SD = 0.17), t(28) = 3.88, p
< 0.001. Moreover, only in the predictable condition partici-
pants obtained a bonus that exceeded chance level (which is
zero), t(28) = 5.39, p < 0.001, whereas this was not the case for
the random condition, t(28) = 0.51, p = 0.61. As expected,
these results show that participants could successfully im-
prove choice behavior by learning in the predictable condition
but not in the random condition.
To investigate whether participants show hallmarks of both
model-free and model-based learning in the predictable con-
dition, we analyzed participants’ stay and switch behavior at
the first decision stage as a function of feedback presented on
the previous trial from the same condition. As a solely reward-
driven learning mechanism, model-free learning is character-
ized by switch behavior following losses and stay behavior
following wins (main effect of reward type). In contrast,
model-based learning additionally relies on the task’s transi-
tion structure guiding behavior. Therefore, model-based learn-
ing in the predictable condition is indicated by a distinct
choice pattern that advocates switches after losses following
common transitions and after wins following rare transitions
but stays after wins following common transitions and after
losses following rare transitions (interaction between reward
and transition type). The left column of Table 1 shows the
results of the logistic regression analysis for the predictable
condition. Consistent with previous studies using related
learning tasks (Daw, 2011; Gillan et al., 2015; Otto,
Gershman, Markman, & Daw, 2013), we found that partici-
pants show both hallmarks of model-free learning (main effect
of reward type) and model-based learning (interaction be-
tween reward and transition type). Figure 1C (left part) shows
the typical pattern indicating a mixture of model-free and
model-based control. While stay probabilities were generally
higher following wins (model-free control), this effect was
modulated by an interactive pattern indicating a reduced link
between wins and stay behavior following rare transitions
(model-based control). Because model-free and model-based
behavior cannot be distinguished in the random condition, we
analyzed these data in a separate analysis. A simplified model
without the variable transition type showed an effect of reward
type, indicating an increased stay probability following wins
(Figure 1C, right part). Together, these analyses demonstrate
that behavior in the predictable condition involved both
model-free and model-based aspects, whereas behavior in
the random condition indicated that participants utilize feed-
back for behavioral adaptation even though this cannot lead to
an increased reward in this condition.
Averaged EEG data
We were now interested in the neural correlates of feedback
processing. Crucially, we expected to find differential effects
of expectancy and valence across conditions for those neural
components that are influenced by the type of internal model.
More specifically, we hypothesized that expectancy and va-
lence effects for these components are solely or more strongly
observable in the predictable condition as only this condition
allows for a feedback-based adaptation of first-stage
decisions.
Analyzing FRN amplitudes at electrode site FCz (Figure 2)
using peak-to-peak measures, we found a significant main
effect of expectancy, F(1, 28) = 15.77, p < 0.001, and a mar-
ginally significant main effect of valence, F(1, 28) = 3.79, p =
0.062, showing more negative amplitudes for unexpected
feedback and for losses compared to expected feedback and
wins. There were no further significant main effects or inter-
actions (Fs < 0.28, ps > 0.600). Analyzing theta band activity
at the same electrode site (Figure 3), we found a marginally
significant main effect of valence, F(1, 28) = 3.42, p = 0.075,
with more theta power for losses than for wins. Again, this
effect did not interact significantly with any other variable (Fs
< 2.13, ps > 0.16). In addition, we obtained a significant main
effect of expectancy, F(1, 28) = 7.72, p = 0.010, indicating
higher power for unexpected outcomes compared with ex-
pected outcomes.
Taken together, we obtained similar results for the FRN
and theta band power regarding valence and expectancy mod-
ulations, although some of these effects reached onlymarginal
significance. Crucially, none of these effects differed between
predictable and random conditions, which suggests that the
FRN and theta are unaffected by the internal model.
Analyzing P3 amplitudes at electrode site Pz (Figure 4), we
found a marginally significant main effect of expectancy, F(1,
28) = 4.15, p = 0.051, which was qualified by a significant
interaction between condition and expectancy, F(1, 28) =
13.30, p = 0.001. Separate analyses for the two conditions
Table 1 Results of the logistic regression predicting stay probabilities
for the predictable and random condition
Coefficient Predictable Random
F Value p value F Value p value
(Intercept) 129.14 <0.001 67.00 <0.001
Reward 43.47 <0.001 30.98 <0.001
Transition 0.004 0.95 - -
Reward x Transition 22.31 <0.001 - -
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revealed that unexpected outcomes led to a more positive
waveform than expected outcomes for the predictable condi-
tion, F(1, 28) = 14.43, p < 0.001, but not for the random
condition, F(1, 28) = 1.35, p = 0.263. Analyzing delta band
activity at the same electrode (Figure 5), we found a signifi-
cant main effect of reward, F(1, 28) = 7.90, p = 0.009, yielding
higher power for wins compared to losses. Furthermore, we
found a marginally significant interaction between condition
and expectancy, F(1, 28) = 4.11, p = 0.052. Again, unexpect-
ed outcomes were associated with more activity than expected
outcomes for the predictable condition, F(1, 28) = 5.82, p =
0.023, but not for the random condition, F(1, 28) = 0.05, p =
0.81.
Taken together, both the P3 and delta band activity showed
a congruent pattern of stronger modulation of expectations for
the predictable condition compared to the random condition.
This suggests that these differences are linked to the different
internal models in the two conditions. Because only the pre-
dictable condition allows for feedback-based adaptation of
first-stage decisions, signatures of (model-based) feedback
evaluation, such as expectancy effects, are increased in the
predictable condition.
Model-based analysis of single-trial EEG data
After finding first neural evidence for the differential effects of
internal models in the predictable and random conditions, we
3 Figure 4G shows that these expectancy effects have no clear posterior dis-
tribution but also reach anterior electrodes. It is therefore possible that our P3
results are generated by two separate positivities: one with an anterior maxi-
mum and one with a posterior maximum. Therefore, we also analyzed P3
amplitudes in the 300-500 ms time window at electrode site FCz. We obtained
a similar pattern as that at electrode Pz, with a significant main effect of
expectancy, F(1,28) = 7.50, p = 0.011, which was qualified by a significant
interaction between expectancy and condition, F(1,28) = 5.16, p = 0.031.
Additionally and in contrast to the posterior P3, we found a significant main
effect of valence, F(1,28) = 5.49, p = 0.026, with more positive amplitudes
following wins compared with losses. It seems possible that this pattern from
our explorative analysis could be generated by a second, more anterior posi-
tivity. However, there is no conclusive evidence in this regard.Visual inspec-
tion of Figures 4A and 4B further suggests strong latency variance for the P3
peaks. Analyzing the latencies, measured at the most positive peak in the 300-
500 ms time window at electrode Pz, we only found a main effect of valence,
F(1.28) = 44.98, p < 0.001 and expectancy, F(1,28) = 8.22, p = 0.008, but no
significant interactions, especially not with condition. An identical pattern was
found at electrode location FCz.
Fig. 2 Feedback-locked time-domain activity at electrode FCz. a, b: Grand average waveform for the predictable and the random conditions. Shaded
areas show the 95% confidence intervals. c, d: Peak-to-peak amplitudes. Gray circles indicate the amplitudes for the individual subjects
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fit a computational reinforcement learning model, which ex-
plicitly models the effects of these internal models on behav-
ior. The predictable internal model was implemented using the
predictable transition structure in order to estimate the first
stage actions, leading to standard model-based behavior
(Daw et al., 2011; Gillan et al., 2015) as demonstrated in the
behavioral analyses. The random internal model was imple-
mented using the random transition structure, which intro-
duced stochastic choice behavior as an alternative to model-
free action selection. Table 2 shows the estimated parameter
values in the predictable and random conditions as well as the
results of t-tests of the condition difference.
In a next step, we used the estimated RPEs from the com-
putational model to inform our analysis of the neural data on a
single-trial level. Formally, the model does not distinguish
between model-based and model-free control at the time of
feedback processing as model-based learning coincides with
model-free learning at the feedback stage. However, it is con-
ceivable that the feedback-related RPE in the model is
reflected differently in neural activity based on the internal
model. Our hypotheses were quite similar to those in the av-
eraged EEG results section. We expected that components
sensitive to the internal model correlate with RPEs more
strongly in the predictable than in the random condition. In
Fig. 3 Feedback-locked theta frequency neural activity at electrode FCz.
a, b: Estimated power for the predictable and the random conditions. The
black rectangle specifies the time window (200-400 ms) and frequency
window (4-8 Hz, theta) of interest. c: Logarithmic frequency scaling of
the difference between losses and wins for each condition and expected-
ness. d:Mean power values in the 200-400 ms time window and 4-8 Hz
frequency window. Gray circles indicate the power values for the indi-
vidual subjects
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all analyses, we used the absolute values of RPEs independent
of sign, and thus feedback valence. If the sign of the slopes
remains the same in both valence conditions, then the under-
ling activity reflects an unsigned RPE. If, however, the sign of
the slopes differs as a function of valence, the underlying
activity reflects a signed RPE.
Regressions involving RPEs and single-trial FRN
amplitudes (Fig. 6A) revealed a significant negative overall
Fig. 4 Feedback-locked time-domain neural activity at electrode Pz. a, b:
Grand average waveform for the predictable and the random conditions.
Shaded areas show the 95% confidence intervals. c, d: Difference waves
of the expectancy effect for the predictable and the random conditions,
calculated as unexpected minus expected. Shaded areas show the 95%
confidence intervals. e, f:Mean amplitudes in the 300-500 ms time win-
dow. Gray circles indicate the mean amplitudes for the individual sub-
jects. g, h: Topographies of the difference wave between unexpected and
expected for each condition and valence 300-500 ms after feedback onset
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slope, t(28) = 2.57, p = 0.016, indicating that trials with larger
RPEs show larger (negative) FRN amplitudes. An ANOVA
with the variables condition and valence revealed no signifi-
cant effects (Fs < 2.03, ps > 0.165). Regressions involving
RPEs and single-trial theta band activity (Figure 6C) showed
a positive overall slope, t(28) = 6.08, p < 0.001, suggesting
that trials with larger RPEs show larger theta band power. But
again, no significant effects were obtained in the ANOVA (Fs
< 1.92, ps > 0.17).
Regressions involving RPEs and single-trial P3
amplitudes (Figures 6B and 6E) revealed a significant main
effect of condition in the ANOVA, F(1, 28) = 4.25, p = 0.049,
indicating that in the predictable condition, the coupling be-
tween single-trial amplitudes and RPEs was stronger com-
pared with the random condition. Qualifying this finding, a
significant positive slope was observed only for the predict-
able condition, t(28) = 2.32, p = 0.023, but not for the random
condition, t(28) = 0.63, p = 0.53, revealing that P3 amplitudes
scaled with absolute RPE magnitude only in the predictable
condition. However, a significant interaction between condi-
tion and valence, F(1, 28) = 6.02, p = 0.020, indicates that this
positive relationship in the predictable condition is particularly
high (and significant only) for negative feedback, t(28) = 3.30,
p = 0.003. Regressions involving RPEs and delta band power
(Figure 6D) revealed no significant overall slope, t(28) = 1.46,
p = 0.16, and only a marginally significant effect of condition,
F(1, 28) = 3.28, p = 0.081. While positive slopes were numer-
ically higher in the predictable condition, they still failed to
reach significance, t(28) = 1.43, p = 0.16.
Taken together, we found significant correlations between
RPEs in our model and three of our four types of feedback-
related brain activity. As predicted, FRN amplitudes and theta
band power correlated with RPEs independent of condition,
suggesting that these components are independent of the in-
ternal model. In contrast, P3 amplitudes correlated with RPEs
only for the predictable condition (and only for negative feed-
back), suggesting that this reflects in-depth feedback process-
ing only under a predictable but not a random internal model.
Discussion
Following current psychological theories of reinforcement
learning, decision making under uncertainty results from the
interaction of two distinct reinforcement learning mecha-
nisms, namely habitual model-free learning and goal-
directed model-based learning (Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010;
Daw et al., 2005). While model-free learning relies on previ-
ous experience with a task, model-based learning uses explicit
knowledge about environmental contingencies to construct
internal models which allow planning and flexible behavior.
The goal of the present study was to investigate how different
internal representations of the environment can influence
behavioral adaptation and neural feedback processing. In or-
der to answer this question, we implemented a modified ver-
sion of the two-stage Markov decision task that employed two
sets with different transition structures (see also Eppinger et al.
2017). In the predictable condition, transition probabilities
were highly differentiated which should favor the application
of an internal model reflecting this predictable structure. In the
random condition, transition probabilities were fixed at
chance which should favor the application of an internal mod-
el reflecting this random structure. Crucially, however, the
reward structure, that is, the conditional probability of a win
given a specific stage-two stimulus, was the same for predict-
able and random conditions. By contrasting the predictable
condition with the random condition, we were able to specif-
ically pinpoint modulations of time and frequency-domain
feedback-locked components that reflect feedback processing
under the different internal models. As an important prerequi-
site for further analyses, we replicated the prominent behav-
ioral finding of a mixture of model-free and model-based RL
in the predictable condition (Daw et al., 2011; Gillan et al.,
2015), which suggests the application of a predictable internal
model. Additionally, in the random condition, we also found a
signature of win-stay/lose-shift behavior, thus illustrating that
feedback was used to adapt behavior even though this could
not improve performance.
In the time domain, ERP findings clearly indicate that the
FRN and P3 component reflect separable neural mechanisms
of feedback processing with different sensitivity to the under-
lying internal model in use. In line with our predictions, the
feedback-locked ERP analysis showed that the neural pattern
reflected in the P3 was clearly differentiated across conditions.
Consistent with previous findings from trial-and-error tasks
(Donaldson, Ait, Sebastien, & Foti, 2016; Hajcak et al.,
2005; Holroyd, Krigolson, Baker, Lee, & Gibson, 2009), we
found higher P3 amplitudes for unexpected outcomes com-
pared to expected outcomes. Crucially, this effect was only
evident in the predictable condition, in which a predictable
internal model was applied, but was absent in the random
condition, in which a random internal model was applied.
We conclude that the feedback-locked P3 is sensitive to the
environmental contingencies as represented by the internal
model.
Concerning the FRN effect, our analysis showed strong
similarities between conditions. In line with previous findings,
the FRN was strongly modulated by the expectancy of the
outcomes with more pronounced effects after unexpected
feedback compared to expected feedback (Eppinger, Kray,
Mock, & Mecklinger, 2008; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Walsh
& Anderson, 2011a, 2011b; but see San Martín, 2012).
Interestingly, the FRN effect (i.e., a larger negativity follow-
ing losses as following wins) was evident in our data but failed
to reach significance. This is surprising, because the FRN
effect seems to be the most widely reported and stable effect
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associated with this component (San Martín, 2012; Walsh &
Anderson, 2012). It could reflect that the absolute amplitude
of the FRN peak represents an unsigned prediction error.
Unsigned prediction errors should be similar for positive and
negative feedback in our paradigm due to the fact that
(conditional) expectancy is perfectly balanced across the two
types of outcome. Summing up, the ERP results of the present
study suggest that while the FRN component was unaffected
by the type of internal model, the feedback-locked P3 was
strongly influenced by the internal models.
The results from the time domain were complemented and
almost paralleled by comparable effects in the frequency do-
main. By showing a very similar pattern as the P3 amplitudes
with stronger expectancy effects in the predictable condition
than in the random condition, centroparietal delta band power
was clearly affected by the environmental contingencies rep-
resented in the internal model. In contrast, theta band power
exhibited no such effect of task condition. Comparable to the
FRN, a strong expectancy effect and only a weak valence
effect in frontocentral theta did not differ between the predict-
able and the random condition, suggesting an insensitivity of
the theta band to the internal model. Together, feedback-
related brain activity in the frequency domain shows a very
similar dichotomy as in the time domain with only delta-band
power being sensitive to the type of the internal model.
To further substantiate our findings, we applied a compu-
tational modeling analysis, which showed that a considerable
amount of model-based control was exerted in the predictable
Fig. 5 Feedback-locked delta frequency neural activity at electrode Pz. a,
b: Estimated power for the predictable and the random conditions. The
black rectangle specifies the time window (300-500 ms) and frequency
window (1-4 Hz, delta) of interest. c: Logarithmic frequency scaling of
the difference between losses and wins for each condition and expected-
ness. d:Mean power values in the 300-500 ms time window and 1-4 Hz
frequency window. Gray circles indicate the power values for the indi-
vidual subjects
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condition whereas the random condition was characterized by
stochastic choice behavior. Most important, this computation-
al model allowed for investigating the relationship between
estimated RPEs and feedback-related brain activity on a
single-trial level. Although the model did not distinguish be-
tween model-free and model-based feedback processing, we
hypothesized that while the RPEs should be reflected in FRN
amplitudes and theta band activity irrespective of experimen-
tal condition and internal model, P3 and delta band activity
should be sensitive to the environmental contingencies dictat-
ed by the internal model at hand. Our results provided further
support for this assumption: FRN amplitudes and theta band
activity correlated with RPEs in both predictable and random
conditions, suggesting that RPEs are reflected in these fronto-
central components (Holroyd and Coles 2002; Cavanagh et al.
2010) but are independent of the internal model. Interestingly,
both the FRN and theta band activity in our data appear to
reflect an unsigned RPE (Alexander & Brown, 2011;
Sambrook & Goslin, 2015), which is line with our interpreta-
tion of the FRN results as discussed above. In contrast, P3
amplitudes correlated with RPEs in predictable conditions
but not in random conditions, suggesting that RPEs are
reflected in this component dependent on the specific internal
model at hand.
Taken together, our results provide support for the idea that
the neural components of feedback processing are differential-
ly modulated by different internal models. On the one hand,
some components, such as the FRN in our study, are unaffect-
ed by representations of environment contingencies but still
capture basic outcome dimensions (e.g., valence and expec-
tancy of feedback or aspects of model-free learning, i.e.,
RPEs). On the other hand, some components, such as the P3
in our study, are strongly affected by internal models. In line
with previous research (Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd,Mol, & Coles,
2004; Wu & Zhou, 2009), this suggests that the FRN is still
involved in learning of the reward structure (e.g., by
representing an RPE), but that higher-order evaluations such
as secondary stimulus features and learning context are not
taken into account. In contrast, the P3 reflects such higher-
order integration of secondary stimulus features and learning
context to flexibly learn the reward structure and even set up
for upcoming behavioral adaptation (Bernat et al., 2015). Our
results also are compatible with the view that the P3 rather
than the FRN is related to the initiation of behavioral adapta-
tion. While some studies reported that the FRN is also associ-
ated with behavioral adaptation (Cohen & Ranganath, 2007),
recent findings suggest that the processes underlying the gen-
eration of the FRN and the related reward positivity are dis-
sociable from the processes responsible for behavioral adap-
tationwhich are linked to the P3 (Chase et al., 2011; Cockburn
& Holroyd, 2018; Yeung, Holroyd, & Cohen, 2005; for a
discussion see San Martín, 2012).
An important question is whether model-based control is
involved only in the predictable condition or also in the ran-
dom condition. A core idea of our study is that participants
form internal models (i.e., explicit representations of transition
probabilities) in both conditions, and that the different internal
models are responsible for the differential patterns in
feedback-locked brain activity. However, the exact role of
model-based control in these effects are unclear. From our
view, there are two possibilities, which mainly differ in their
definition of model-based control. First, if model-based con-
trol is narrowly defined as translating knowledge about pre-
dictable transitions into expectations that inform RL, then on-
ly the predictable condition involves model-based control. In
this case, contrasting the predictable and random conditions in
our paradigm corresponds to a comparison between a condi-
tion with model-based control and a condition without model-
based control. Second, if model-based control is wider defined
as any goal-directed influence of explicit knowledge on RL,
then the computational mechanism in our model that intro-
duces stochastic choice behavior (i.e., randomness) in the ran-
dom condition also could be interpreted as model-based con-
trol. In this case, our conditions do not differ regarding wheth-
er model-based control is exerted but regarding the type of
model-based control.
The latter possibility receives support from the observation
that stochastic choice behavior can be viewed as an adaptive
and goal-directed strategy in certain tasks. In a recent study
(Tervo et al., 2014), rats only received reward if their decision
differed from the decision of a competitor on the same trial.
For choice patterns of specific competitors, rats were able to
maximize reward by switching to stochastic choice behavior.
Although it is unclear whether this strategy was driven by an
internal model (Tervo et al. denied this idea), these findings
Table 2 Results of the comparison between the parameters derived
from the computational model
Parameter Bounds Predictable1 Random1 t-
value2
Learning rate [0,1] 0.21(0.04) 0.21(0.04) 0.74
Eligibility trace [0,1] 0.96(0.01) 0.96(0.01) 0.27
Inverse temperature [0, ∞] 1.95(0.67) 1.63 (0.51) 2.59*
Model-basedness [0,1] 0.33(0.07) 0.29(0.08) -3
Perseveration [-∞,∞] 0.73(0.29) 0.76(0.28) -0.63
Note. We fit a hierarchical Bayesian model using MCMC sampling with
set-specific free parameters. We ran 4 chains with 2,000 iterations (1000
warm-up). Rhat < 1.1.
1Mean (standard error)
2 df = 28, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
3No statistical test of the model-basedness parameter was applied, be-
cause this parameter possibly has a different meaning in the two condi-
tions. While it refers to the contribution of model-based control in the
predictable condition, it represents an additional source of noise (i.e.,
randomness) in the random condition
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provide support for the idea that randomness can be goal-
directed and adaptive. Interestingly, the switch towards sto-
chastic behavior in this study was mediated by noradrenergic
input from the locus coeruleus (LC) to the anterior cingulate
(Tervo et al., 2014)—two structures with a strong link to the
neural activity investigated in our study. The FRN is hypoth-
esized to originate from the anterior cingulate (Holroyd &
Coles, 2002; Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997) and the P3 is
linked to noradrenergic activity via the LC-P3 hypothesis
(Nieuwenhuis, 2011; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005). This raises
the possibility that both components could play a role in arbi-
trating between decision strategies.
But how is the model-based mechanism able to keep track
of the environmental contingencies and generate distinct
models which enable goal-directed planning? A plausible so-
lution is the additional recruitment of working memory func-
tions. While the updating of working memory representations
has frequently been assumed to be reflected in the P3 and delta
band activity (Donchin & Coles, 1988; Nieuwenhuis et al.,
2005), new evidence suggests that the P3 constitutes a target
identification mechanism which is only guided by working
memory (Rac-Lubashevsky & Kessler, 2019). Nevertheless,
there are two principal ways how working memory could
become involved under model-based control. First, informa-
tion from outcome feedback could be utilized to update the
internal world model, thus advancing explicit learning in the
model-based mechanism via experience. Evidence for this
comes from a variety of neuroimaging and modeling studies
(Braver and Cohen 2000; O’Reilly and Frank 2006;
D’Ardenne et al. 2012). For example, a recent high-
resolution fMRI study showed a correlation between BOLD
signals in VTA, a region implicated in generating phasic do-
pamine signals, and rDLPFC, a region implicated in context
encoding and working memory, which suggests that phasic
dopamine signals (i.e., outcome information) regulate
encoding and updating of context representations in PFC
(D’Ardenne et al., 2012). Second, outcome representations
in working memory could be used to gate learning in the
dopaminergic reinforcement learning system. Evidence for
such a top-down gating mechanism comes from studies
linking reinforcement learning to working memory capacity
and load (Collins, Albrecht, Waltz, Gold, & Frank, 2017;
Collins, Brown, Gold, Waltz, & Frank, 2014; Collins &
Frank, 2018). For example, Collins et al. (2017) showed that
the generation of learning signals was affected by working
memory load with stronger RPEs being generated under high
working memory load. Eppinger, Walter, Heekeren, and Li,
(2013) provided evidence for a link between working memory
capacity and the strength of model-based control, and argued
that working memory is necessary for the integration of model
free learning signals with model-based control. Taken togeth-
er, this clearly shows the importance of the mechanisms of
working memory recruitment and further emphasizes their
significance for understanding model-based learning.
Notably, our ERP findings nicely complement a study by
Eppinger et al. (2017) investigating the interplay between
model-free and model-based decision processes using a rather
similar experimental design regarding the transition structure.
Although not including the feedback-locked P3 in their anal-
yses, the authors show that the stimulus-locked P3 at the sec-
ond stage of the Markov task (which required a choice in their
study) reflected the integration of both model-free and model-
based calculations, whereas the FRN following feedback did
not. This finding parallels our results and supports a putative
mechanism linking the FRN and the feedback-related P3 to
model-free and model-based reinforcement learning. While
the FRN seems to reflect a model-free process, more specifi-
cally the calculation of a RPE conveyed by the dopaminergic
reward system (Holroyd & Coles, 2002), the P3 seems to
signal the utilization of such model-free calculations which
is dependent on the internal model. While the integration of
model-free estimations helps maximizing reward in a predict-
able environment, this is not the case in a random
environment.
Another effort in this direction was reported by a recent
EEG study (Sambrook et al., 2018), which reports a method
to separate model-free and model-based RPEs in the classic
variant of the Markov decision task. The authors showed that
neural activity varies with model-free and model-based RPEs
at the feedback stage. Moreover, a correlation between both
RPEs and early frontal components emphasized the temporal
and spatial interplay between learning mechanisms. While the
early frontal correlate of model-based RPEs was independent
of participants’ model-basedness, late centroparietal activity
was strongly modulated by the extent of expressed model-
based control (Sambrook et al., 2018). Due to its temporal
and spatial characteristics, this late model-based effect is
discussed by the authors to originate from neural sources pri-
marily associated with the P3. This interpretation is fully com-
patible with the present result that the P3 is influenced by the
internal model. Both approaches share the notion of a two-fold
instantiation of reinforcement learning on the neural level:
Early calculation of RPEs and subsequent later utilization,
Fig. 6 Mean standardized regressionweights for the relationship between
absolute reward prediction error estimates and single-trial neural activity.
Gray circles indicate regression weights for the individual subjects. a:
FRN activity was estimated via peak-to-peak measures at electrode
FCz. b: P3 activity was estimated via averaging at electrode Pz in the
300-500 ms time window. c: Theta activity was estimated via averaging
at electrode FCz in the 200-400 ms time window and 4-8 Hz frequency
window. d: Delta activity was estimated via averaging at electrode Pz in
the 300-500 ms time window and 1-4 Hz frequency window. e:
Representative data from participant 16 for single-trial regression be-
tween reward prediction error estimates and P3 amplitudes. Note that
for the results reported we used absolute reward prediction errors
R
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whereas the latter is particularly dependent on model-based
control. In conclusion, this calls for the reevaluation and mod-
ification of standard reinforcement learning models in order to
further elucidate the interplay between the cognitive mecha-
nisms of model-free and model-based learning mechanisms in
the human brain.
Taken together, our findings further substantiate the as-
sumption, that the feedback-locked components under inves-
tigation reflect different mechanisms of feedback processing
(Bernat et al., 2015; Cavanagh, 2015; Hajcak, Moser,
Holroyd, & Simons, 2006; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004). While
early frontal components (FRN and theta) are suggested to
reflect a first evaluation of outcomes by a model-free RL
mechanism, subsequent posterior components (P3 and delta)
are supposed to be involved in higher-order evaluations exe-
cuted or supervised by a RL mechanism that is guided by an
internal model. Crucially, our study further suggests that dif-
ferent internal models of the task environment exert control
over reinforcement learning only at this latter stage of feed-
back processing, leading to a selective integration and
updating of new information.
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